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ARTICLES
CONDITIONAL FEDERAL SPENDING AND
THE STATES "FREE EXERCISE" OF
THE TENTH AMENDMENT
KRISTIAN D. WHITTEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,1 Congress enacted the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 2 In enacting RFRA, Con-
gress sought to require States that burden "free exercise" to show
a compelling State interest for doing so. As consitutional author-
ity for enacting RFRA, Congress relied on section one of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and its power under section five of that
Amendment to, "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of [that] article."3 Last year, in City of Boerne v. Flores4 the
* Mr. Whitten is Senior Counsel for Bank of America, San Francisco, CA.
He received his J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of Law
and his L.L.M. from the Georgetown University Law Center. Mr. Whitten would
like to thank Professors Saperstein and Walker for their help and guidance, Judi
Collins for patience and technical support and his brother, Alan, for his part in
the publication of this article.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This case involved an Oregon law that criminalized
the use of peyote. A group of Native Americans who used the substance as part
of a religious ritual challenged the statute. The court sustained the law as it
applied to the challengers.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). The act sought: (1) to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconson v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide
a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened
by government. Id. at § 2000bb(b).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
4. 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
1
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Supreme Court held that RFRA's attempt to redefine the standard
for judging constitutionally-protected religious freedoms as set
forth in Smith was an unconstitutional attempt to use section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment to "control cases and
controversies.
In doing so, the Court held that Congress' power under sec-
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize it to
pass "general legislation upon the rights of the citizens,"6 and
rejected [a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-
remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The Court
also held that Congress may not establish the ultimate meaning of
Constitutional provisions,' stating:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Four-
teenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution
be "superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."
It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like
other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it.
9
Thus, the Court held that Congress may not define the mean-
ing of the First Amendment's "free exercise" clause, and may not
by general legislation impose its definition of free exercise on the
States.
The Boerne decision prompted Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted
Kennedy, and Representatives Charles Canady and Jerrold Nad-
ler, to introduce legislation that would revive the "compelling
state interest" test, and would make that test applicable to State
"programs or activities" that receive federal funds, and in cases
where a State burdens a person's "free exercise" of religon "in or
affecting commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, or with the Indian tribes;.. ."10 In essence, Congress has
proposed attaching a "free exercise" condition to all federal
spending. "
5. Id. at 2172.
6. Id. at 2166, (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883)).
7. Id. at 2167.
8. Id. at 2167.
9. Id. at 2168 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
10. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, S. 2148, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.;
H.R. 4019, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 8, 1998) (hereinafter RLPA).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Professor Jesse Choper suggests that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to reenact RFRA, "as long as
Congress has a 'rational basis' for concluding that incidental religious burdens
from generally applicable laws might substantially affect interstate travel,..."
[Vol. 21:5
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This article will examine Congress' power under the Spending
Clause, and will seek to determine whether, by using its spending
power, Congress can constitutionally impose a "free exercise" con-
dition on States and local governments. Part II discusses federal-
ism and the Court's "free exercise" clause jurisprudence. Part III
addresses the substance of the proposed RLPA. Parts IV and V
examine the Court's shifting posture towards the Spending Clause
and federalism respectively. Part VI contrasts the broad provi-
sions of the RLPA, with the more narrow conditions found in the
Equal Access Act. Finally, Part VII concludes that enactment of
the proposed RLPA would constitute an unconstitutional com-
mandeering of state police power.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
When the Constitution of the United States was signed at
Philadelphia on September 17, 1787, it established a federal gov-
ernment of enumerated powers. The Framers intended that:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former
will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will for the most part be connected. The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs; concern the lives, liberties, and proper-
ties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and pros-
perity of the State. 2
Among those "few and defined" enumerated powers granted
to the federal government was the power to "lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, ... and provide for the ... general
Welfare of the United States. "13
In order to quiet the protests of Anti-federalists, who were
opposed to the Constitution, the Framers agreed to amendments
adopted by the First Congress and ratified by the States which
On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual
Consequences: A Reveiw of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2259, 2306 (1998). On August 6, 1998 the Constutition Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee deleted the the Commerce Clause language from the
House version of the RLPA. H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (August 6, 1998).
The Commerce Clause language remains in the Senate version.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
19981
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have come to be known as the Bill of Rights. James Madison, who
enjoyed the reputation as "Father" of the Constitution, initially
opposed the Bill of Rights, but ultimately came to support those
proposed amendments after his home state of Virginia ratified the
Constitution with the stipulation that a "Declaration of Rights,"
which had been submitted by the Anti-federalists, be sent to the
Congress along with the Form of Ratification.' 4 The States ulti-
mately ratified ten of the twelve proposed amendments in 1791.1'
The proposed RLPA involves the First and the Tenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution. The First Amendment provides, in
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;... "16 The Tenth
Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."17
In addition to delegating enumerated legislative powers to the
federal Congress, the Constitution established the Supreme Court
of the United States, whose power extends "to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; . .. "Is In the early case of Marbury v.
Madison," the Supreme Court held it was its province to deter-
mine whether Congressional legislation is inconsistent with the
Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that
It is, emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each .. .If then the courts are to regard the
constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of
the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.20
14. J. Kaminski & G. Soladino, Eds., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. X at 1512-1515 (State Historical Society
of Wisconsin, 1993).
15. Id. at 5.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. Id. at 177-78.
[Vol. 21:5
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss1/3
CONDITIONAL FEDERAL SPENDING
Thus, the Supreme Court established that its Constitutional
power extends to reviewing acts of Congress and that the Court is
the final authority on what the Constitution means.
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied.21 During the Congressional debate surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, its proponents sought to have lan-
guage adopted that would have made the Bill of Rights applicable
to the States. One of the Amendment's sponsors in the House of
Representatives, Congressman John Bingham of Ohio, believed
that the Bill of Rights was originally intended to apply to the
States. He believed the Supreme Court's decision in the case of
Barron v. Baltimore,22 which held that the Bill of Rights operated
as a restraint on Congress only, was mistaken.23 However, Con-
gressman Bingham's original version of the proposed Amendment
was not approved by Congress.24 After his first draft was rejected,
Congressman Bingham disavowed any intention "to take away
from any state any right that belonged to it... ,"25 and confirmed
publicly during the ratification process that the Amendment as
enacted "takes from no State any right which hitherto pertains to
the several states"26 Thus, Congressman Bingham's desire that
the first eight Amendments be made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment was not the will of Congress or of the
ratifying States.2
As ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Bill
of Rights applicable to the States, but its Fifth section granted to
Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 of the amendment states: All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. Id. at § 1.
22. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
23. H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
62 (1977) ("Meyer")
24. Id. at 63-64.
25. R. BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133
(1989) ("Berger")
26. J. James, The Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 46 (1983), citing,
Cincinnati Commercial, 10 August 1866, quoting a speech by Congressmen
Bingham.
27. Berger, supra note 25 at 133.
1998]
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provisions of [the Amendment.] '28 As its sponsor, Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan, made clear that section Five "enables Con-
gress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with the prin-
ciples of the Amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal
Congressional enactment." 29 Notwithstanding the Framers'
intent, since adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in giving
content to its due process clause, "the Court has looked increas-
ingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance to the point where many of
the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments have been
selectively absorbed into the Fourteenth."30 Thus, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,31 the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's "due process" clause effectively incorporated that portion of
the Constitution's First Amendment which states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting. .. the free exercise [of religion], " thus
"render[ing] the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Con-
gress to enact such laws."32
In the years since Cantwell, the Supreme Court has
addressed various challenges to State laws that were alleged to
infringe the "free exercise" of religion. In Sherbert v. Verner,3 3 the
Court adopted a balancing test for evaluating State laws that
were alleged to burden the "free exercise" of religion. The Court
held that a State statute that burdens the "free exercise" of reli-
gion may only be upheld if "some compelling state interest . . .
justifies the substantial infringement. '34  Twenty-seven years
after Sherbert, in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith35 the Supreme Court abandoned the Sherbert
test in favor of a new rule holding that generally applicable State
laws may be applied to religious practices even when not sup-
ported by a compelling State interest.3 6 This holding led to RFRA,
which was held unconstitutional in Boerne. Since the Boerne deci-
sion, religious groups have lobbied Congress to resurrect the "com-
pelling state interest" test, using its other enumerated powers,
including the Spending Clause. Thus emerged the RLPA.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV§ 5.
29. Meyer, supra., note 23 at 84.
30. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 772 (1988), quoting, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
31. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
32. Id. at 303.
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. Id. at 406.
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36. Id. at 882.
[Vol. 21:5
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III. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT
The proposed Congressional legislation, referred to as the
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 ("RLPA") provides a
"General Rule" in section 2(a): "Except as provided in subsection
(b), a government shall not substantially burden a person's reli-
gious exercise-(1) in a program or activity, operated by a govern-
ment, that receives Federal financial assistance; . . . even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability."37 Section 2(b)
of the RLPA provides: "Exception.- A government may substan-
tially burden a person's religious exercise if the government dem-
onstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest."38 The RLPA defines a "program or activity"
receiving federal financial assistance by incorporating the defini-
tion of that term contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,39 which states:
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term "program or activ-
ity" and the term "program" mean all of the operations of-(1)(A) a
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumen-
tality of a State or of a local government; or (B) the entity of such
State or local government that distributes such assistance and
each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the
case of assistance to a State or local government; (2)(A) a college,
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system
of higher education; or (B) a local educational agency (as defined in
section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965), system of vocational education or other school system; ...
any part of which is extended federal financial assistance.
The relevant part of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."4 The
Supreme Court has held that Title VI provides no greater protec-
tion than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
37. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. § 2.
38. See, Id. § 2(b).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
19981
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ment.4 1 Thus, Title VI's conditions on federal spending are
authorized by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
permits Congress to enforce section one's Equal Protection Clause
"by appropriate legislation."42
The definitions of "program or activity" were added by Con-
gress as part of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, in order
to overturn a Supreme Court ruling that had held a "program or
activity" meant only those entities that actually received federal
funds.43 Thus, statutes that incorporate this definition of "pro-
gram or activity," "apply to the entirety of any state or local insti-
tution that has a program or activity funded by the federal
government,"44 and include all of the operations of a State or local
institution receiving federal financial assistance.45 The federal
condition applies "on an institution-wide basis, instead of only in
connection with a limited program activity actually receiving fed-
eral funds... "46 Therefore, it has been held that a State entity is
a "program or activity" even though it did not receive federal
funds, as long as the State received such funds. An example will
illustrate the breadth of the definition:
Section 2000d-4a provides that a "program or activity" (or just
a "program") includes "all the operations of' any one of a number
of entities, subject only to the proviso that at least one (or, as the
statute provides, "any") "part of" that entity's operations "is
extended Federal financial assistance." Thus, in the case of a
public "college" (to use subsection (2)(A) as an example), so long as
"any part" of that college's "operations" receive "federal financial
assistance," "all" of that college's "operations" are "programs or
activities" [as defined in that section].48 If federal health assist-
ance is extended to a part of a state health department, the entire
41. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992), (citing, Regents of
the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Id.
at 328 (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
43. See Assn. of Mexican-American Educators v. State of California, 836 F.
Supp. 1534, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1993), (citing, Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984)).
44. Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. See also, Hodges By Hodges v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 864 F. Supp.
1493, 1505 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
46. Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414, 1416
(E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd 869 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989).
47. Mexican-American Educators, supra, 836 F. Supp. at 1545.
48. Id. at 1543-1544.
[Vol. 21:5
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health department would be covered in all of its operations. If the
office of a mayor receives federal financial assistance and distrib-
utes it to local departments or agencies, all of the operations of the
mayor's office are covered along with the departments or agencies
which actually get the aid. But the [definition] was not, so far as
we are able to determine ... , intended to sweep in the whole state
or local government, so that if two little crannies (the personnel
and medical departments) of one city agency (the fire department)
discriminate, the entire city government is in jeopardy of losing its
federal financial assistance.49
It has also been held that a City is not a "program or activity"
of a State, but a sub-part of a City's operations is a "program or
activity" if the City receives federal funds.50 Thus, actual receipt
of federal financial assistance is not the sine qua non for being
subjected to the conditions attached to federal funds; rather, the
inquiry is whether the entity in question is part of the operations
of a State or a local government that has, itself, received federal
financial assistance.5 ' Under this broad definition it appears that
virtually any subdivision, "department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality"52 of a State or local government
that has received federal funds would be bound by the federal
"free exercise" condition if the RLPA becomes law.
53
IV. THE FEDERAL SPENDING POWER
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution states: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ..."I'
49. Schroeder, 927 F.2d at 962, (quoting, S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1988), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1988, 3, 18).
50. Hodges By Hodges, 864 F. Supp. at 1506-07.
51. Id. at 1506.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4(a)(1)(A).
53. It might be argued that, by parenthetically setting off "operated by a
government" from the rest of its "free exercise" General rule attached to federal
funds, Congress intends the RLPA's "free exercise" condition to apply only in
those "programs or activities" which actually receive federal financial assistance.
However, the RLPA's incorporation of the broad definition of "program or
activity" from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which was specifically amended in
1987 to overrule a Supreme Court decision which had given such a restrictive
definition to that term, negates any such Congressional intent. See text
accompanying footnotes 43-46, supra.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
1998]
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The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress' power to "pro-
vide for the Common Defense and General Welfare of the United
States" to afford Congress the power "to authorize expenditure of
public monies for public purposes [which] is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. 55 In
the 1923 Massachusetts v. Melon decision,5 6 the Supreme Court
upheld the federal Maternity Act's attempt to reduce maternal
and infant mortality by attaching the Act's conditions to federal
spending. The Court rejected the State's Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge, and held that "the powers of the State are not invaded,
since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an
option which the State is free to accept or reject."5 7 The Court
noted: "[i]f Congress enacted [the Act] with the ulterior purpose of
tempting [states] to yield [a right reserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment], that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple
expedient of not yielding." 8
Thirteen years later, in United States v. Butler5 9 the Court
addressed the taxing and spending scheme Congress adopted in
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. That Act increased the
price of certain farm products by decreasing the quantities pro-
duced. The decrease in quantity was accomplished by paying
farmers to let their land lay fallow for a period of time. To pay
those farmers for the fallow land a tax was levied on the process-
ing of commodities derived from the farm products being regu-
lated.60 The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture "to make
agreements with individual farmers for a reduction of acreage or
production upon such terms as he may think fair and reason-
able."61 The Court held that the tax was a "mere incident" to a
program designed to regulate agricultural production,6 2 which
was beyond Congress' enumerated powers. While the Court noted
that the federal government did not try to sustain the Act under
the Commerce Clause,63 it conceded that Congress' power to tax
55. L. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1919 (1995), (quoting, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1935))
(Baker).
56. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
57. Id. at 479-80.
58. Id. at 482.
59. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
60. Id. at 54-55.
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 61.
63. Id. at 64.
[Vol. 21:5
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and spend, "is not limited by direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution."
64
The Court ultimately held the Act to be a violation of the
Tenth Amendment, and beyond Congress' power to tax and spend
for the "general Welfare."65 In reaching its holding, the Court
noted that the Constitution gave Congress no power to directly
regulate and control agricultural production, and concluded that
the Tenth Amendment precluded Congress from enacting condi-
tional spending legislation in order to achieve that regulatory
end.66 Finding that a farmer might refuse to comply with the Act,
but that the price of such a refusal would be a loss of benefits, 67
the Court stated: "[tihe amount offered is intended to be sufficient
to exert pressure on [the farmer] to agree to the proposed regula-
tion."68 The Court focused on the "obvious difference between a
statute stating the conditions upon which monies shall be
expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual
obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be
enforced."69 The Court found that the Spending Clause did not
abrogate other Constitutional limitations on Congressional spend-
ing power, holding as one commentator paraphrased it:
If, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states'
reserved jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could
invoke the taxing and spending power as a means to accomplish
the same end, Clause 1 of Section 8 of Article 1 would become the
instrument for total subversion of the governmental powers
reserved to the individual states, and that the language allowing
Congress to spend for the "general Welfare," did not provide a
Congressional loophole around the Tenth Amendment. It does not
help to declare that local conditions throughout the nation have
created a situation of national concern; for this is but to say that
whenever there is a widespread similarity of local conditions, Con-
gress may ignore Constitutional limitations upon its own powers
and usurp those reserved to the states. 70
Thus, the Court in Butler made it clear that, although Con-
gress' spending power is not strictly limited by express grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution, it may not use its
64. 297 U.S. at 66.
65. Id. at 68.
66. Baker, supra note 54 at 1927.
67. Butler, 297 U.S. at 70-71.
68. Id. at 70-71.
69. Baker, supra note 54 at 1927, (citing, Butler, 297 U.S. at 73).
70. Id., (citing, Butler, 297 U.S. at 74-75).
1998]
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spending power to usurp State powers reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. It should be noted that Butler dealt with federal leg-
islation that attempted to regulate individual rather than State
conduct, and that the money Congress sought to conditionally
spend was to be paid to farmers and not to the State.
The next year, in Chas. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis7 the
Court confronted a challenge to the unemployment insurance pro-
visions of the Social Security Act of 1935. The Act called for pay-
ment of a federal tax on individuals' income to fund
unemployment insurance, and granted those taxpayers up to a
ninety percent credit for unemployment insurance taxes paid to
the State, as long as that State's unemployment insurance pro-
gram was approved by the federal Social Security Board. The fed-
eral goal was to encourage States to adopt an unemployment
insurance plan in conformance with the relevant federal regula-
tions, which the petitioner asserted was an intrusion into reserved
State power in violation of the Tenth Amendment.72
The Court found the tax to be a valid exercise of Congres-
sional power and that the unemployment insurance plan was not
a "weapon of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of
the states. '73 After discussing the unemployment crisis facing the
country, the Court characterized the Federal Unemployment
Insurance Program as "a cooperative endeavor to avert a common
evil,"74 finding that the petitioner's position "confuses motive with
coercion." 75 The Court further stated:
Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it inter-
poses an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed." In like manner, every rebate from a tax
when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation.
But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is
to plunge the law in endless difficulties ... We do not say that a tax
is valid when imposed by an act of Congress, if it is laid upon the
condition that a state may escape its operation through the adop-
tion of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly
within the scope of national policy and power ... It is one thing to
impose a tax dependent upon the conduct of the tax payers, or of
the state in which they live, where the conduct to be stimulated or
discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in
71. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 586.
74. Id. at 587.
75. 301 U.S. at 589.
[Vol. 21:5
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its normal operation, or to any other end legitimately national. It
is quite another thing to say that a tax will be abated upon the
doing of an act that will satisfy the fiscal need, the tax and the
alternative being approximate equivalents. In such circum-
stances, if in no others, inducement or persuasion does not go
beyond the bounds of power.76
The Court in Steward Machine found that the "State is free at
pleasure to disregard or to fulfill" the requirements of the Federal
Unemployment Insurance Program.7 Thus, that Program did not
force the State to surrender any of its sovereignty, or invade rights
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
Ten years later, the Court addressed the conditional grant of
federal money directly to States, and articulated a somewhat less
rigorous standard of analysis for those grants than the one
announced in Butler. In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission,78 the Court was called upon to decide the constitu-
tionality of the federal Hatch Act's conditioning of an award of fed-
eral highway funds upon Oklahoma's compliance with the Act's
prohibition against State officials taking "any active part in polit-
ical management or in political campaigns. 7 9 Oklahoma refused
to remove a member of its State Highway Commission who was
found to have violated the Hatch Act, and faced the prospect of
losing federal highway funds in an amount equal to two years
compensation of the offending official.8 0 The Court rejected
Oklahoma's Tenth Amendment challenge, noting that Congress
"has no power to regulate local political activities as such of state
officials," but that Congress "does have power to fix the terms
upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed. '8 1
The Court also noted that the Tenth Amendment "has been con-
sistently construed 'as not depriving the national government of
authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted
end."'8 2 The Court concluded that the federal condition was
"appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end", because
Congress was attempting to insure the integrity of State officials
76. Id. at 589-92.
77. Id. at 595.
78. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
79. Id. at 129 n.1.
80. Id. at 133.
81. Id. at 143.
82. Baker, supra n. 55 at 1928, (citing, Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143, (quoting,
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)) (emphasis added)).
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who administered federal funds.8 3 The Court also noted that
Oklahoma had exercised the option left to it by Congress in not
removing the offending official; it had chosen "the 'simple expedi-
ent' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion."84
Forty years later, the Court addressed Congress' attempt to
directly regulate the States' laws concerning possession of alcohol
by minors by conditioning the award of federal highway funds on
the States' adopting a 21-year-old drinking age. In South Dakota
v. Dole,85 the State challenged Congressional legislation that
directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage
of federal highway funds from States that permit "the purchase or
public possession... of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is
less than twenty-one years of age."86 South Dakota claimed that,
under the Twenty-First Amendment, States have "virtually com-
plete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor
and how to structure the liquor distribution system.""7 The Court
declined to address the Twenty-First Amendment issue, deciding
instead that the Congressional statute was an appropriate exer-
cise of Congress' spending power.88
The Court in Dole cited Butler in reiterating that "the power
of Congress to authorize expenditures of public moneys for public
purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution,"8 9 and went on to note that the spend-
ing power is limited by four "general restrictions articulated in our
cases."9" First, the exercise of the spending power must be "in
pursuit of 'the general welfare."91 Second, Congress' conditioning
of federal funds must be unambiguous, "enabling the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation."92 Third, the Court noted that Congressional
conditions on spending "might be illegitimate if they are unrelated
'to the federal interest in particular national projects or pro-
83. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143.
84. Id. at 143.
85. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
86. 23 U.S.C. § 158.
87. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205, (quoting, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
88. Id. at 206.
89. Id. at 207, (quoting, Butler, 297 U.S. at 66).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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grams.' ' 93 Fourth, the Court noted "that other Constitutional pro-
visions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of
federal funds."94
The Dole Court quickly disposed of the first three limitations
on conditional federal spending, finding that South Dakota did not
"seriously" challenge Congress' meeting those three restrictions.95
The Court found that the federal drinking age is designed to serve
the general welfare, the conditions on federal spending are clearly
stated, and South Dakota "has never contended that the congres-
sional action was . . . unrelated to a national concern in the
absence of the Twenty-First Amendment."
96
Addressing the fourth restriction on conditional federal
spending, the Court held that the "independent constitutional
bar" limitation on the federal spending power is not "a prohibition
on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not
empowered to achieve directly."97 Instead, the Court held: "[W]e
think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the
unexceptional proposition that the power may not be used to
induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional."9 " However, the Court also noted that "in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might
be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion."'9 9 But in Dole the Court found compelling the fact
that a State's failure to comply with the federal drinking age
would result in it losing only five percent of the funds otherwise
available under the federal highway grant programs.' 00 This was
found to be a "relatively mild encouragement to the States", which
allows those States to retain their prerogative over their drinking
age. 101 Thus, the Court in Dole found that the threat of losing five
percent of the allocable highway funds did not amount to Congress
93. Id. at 207-08, (quoting, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978), (plurality opinion)).
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id.
96. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (quoting, Brief for Petitioner at 52.)
97. Id. at 209-10.
98. Id. at 210.
99. Id. at 211, (quoting, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
100. Id.
101. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
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regulating "those purposes which are within the exclusive prov-
ince of the states."1°2
Justice O'Connor dissented in Dole, disagreeing with the
majority's reading of Butler, and finding that the regulation of
States' drinking age was outside Congress' power because it falls
"within the ambit of ... the Twenty-First Amendment." °3 She
noted:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion
of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial
resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause
gives 'power to Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the
states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole peo-
ple, subject to no restrictions save such as are self imposed."0 4
Justice O'Connor concluded that:
"Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money
should be spent",10 5 stressing that, "[t]he immense size and power
of the Government of the United States ought not obscure its fun-
damental character. It remains a government of enumerated
powers."106
Justice Brennan also dissented in Dole, agreeing with Justice
O'Connor that "regulation of the minimum age of purchasers of
liquor falls squarely within the ambit of those powers reserved to
the States by the Twenty-First Amendment", and that "Congress
cannot condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges this
right." 0 7 His agreement with Justice O'Connor may be puzzling
to some, but apparently reflects his belief that the Twenty-First
Amendment expressly reserved to the States the power to define
their drinking age. It has also been suggested that, while Justice
Brennan generally supported "broad national powers", he was
"wary of validating" the Chief Justice's argument that the federal
government's "greater" power to tax and spend necessarily
includes the "lesser" power to condition the spending. 08 In any
102. Butler, 297 U.S. at 69.
103. Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), (quoting, Butler, 297 U.S. at 78).
105. Id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), (citing, McCullough v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)).
107. Id. at 212 (Brennan J., dissenting).
108. See, D. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 52 n. 240 (1996), (quoting, Baker, supra n. 55 at 1915 n.13
("Th[e] apparent inconsistency in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern for 'states'
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event, even the interstate effects of federal spending for highways
was insufficient to overcome the State's reserved power. For Jus-
tices Brennan and O'Connor, even this modest federal incursion
into an area that is clearly reserved to the States is not permitted
by the Spending Clause.
The majority in Dole upheld a federal spending plan that
clearly conditioned receipt of a portion of the federal funds upon
the State's giving up a right reserved to it by the Constitution. In
addition, one of the Court's most liberal Justices and one of its
most conservative dissented on the ground that "Congress cannot
condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges powers
reserved to the States"10 9 Given the result in Dole, how is the
Court likely to rule on the RLPA?
V. FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT
Since Dole was decided, the Supreme Court has decided three
cases that have limited Congress' power to enact legislation affect-
ing States, and that may impact the application of Dole in subse-
quent Congressional efforts to regulate States' conduct. In New
York v. United States, '10 the Court held unconstitutional a portion
of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985, which imposed on the States an obligation to provide
for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their bor-
ders. The Act provided three "incentives" to States in order to
comply with that obligation:
1) Financial incentives that were awarded States for develop-
ing sites to receive radioactive waste from other States;
2) "Access" incentives that allowed States with waste sites to
gradually increase the cost of access to their sites, and ultimately
deny access to waste from States that do not meet federal dead-
lines; and
3) "Take Title" incentives that require a State which does not
provide for the disposal of all internally generated radioactive
rights' might be explained by his long standing attraction to the argument that
the government's 'greater power' (for example, the power to not offer the states
any money at all) includes the 'lesser power' (for example, the power to offer the
states funds subject to any conditions the federal government chooses.")). See
also, D. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE L.J. 1, 61 n. 252 (1994)
(asserting that Justice Brennan's Dole dissent aligns him with the Butler
majority).
109. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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waste to "take title" and become liable for all damages suffered as
a result of, that waste.
1 11
The Court held that the "monetary" and "access" incentives
were consistent with the Tenth Amendment, but the "take title"
incentives were not." 2 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion noted
that: "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.' '1 3 She found that compli-
ance with the "take title" provisions "would commandeer state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes", and
that Congress has "held out the threat, should the States not regu-
late according to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the
States to submit to another federal instruction."" 4 She noted, "[a]
choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory tech-
niques is no choice at all. Either way, 'the Act commandeers the
legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.' ' 1 5 Justice
O'Connor concluded:
Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are eas-
ily overlooked ... But the Constitution protects us from our own
best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among
branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temp-
tation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solu-
tion to the crisis of the day . . .States are not mere political
subdivisions of the United States. State ,governments are neither
regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on
the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart.
The Constitution instead 'leaves to the several States a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty', reserved explicitly to the States by the
Tenth Amendment." 6
Less than three years later, in United States v. Lopez, 1"1 the
Court held that Congress had legislated beyond its commerce
power when it enacted the provisions of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for "any individ-
111. Id. at 152-54.
112. Id. at 185-86.
113. 505 U.S. at 161, (quoting, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
114. Id. at 175-76, (quoting, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 187-88.
117. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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ual knowingly to possess a firearm... at a place that the individ-
ual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 118
The Court noted Congress' broad power under the Commerce
Clause, but concluded that rather than "commandeering" State
government, the statute at issue "ha[d] nothing to do with 'com-
merce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms."'119 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion cited and discussed many of the Court's opinions granting
Congress broad power under the Commerce Clause, but found
that "when Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it affects a 'change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. ' 120
Two years later in Printz v. United States,'2 ' the majority
Justices who decided Lopez, struck down provisions of the Brady
Hand Gun Violence Prevention Act which commands State chief
law enforcement officers to perform background checks and file
reports concerning prospective handgun purchasers. 122 The Court
held that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 23 "permitted
the imposition of an obligation on State judges to enforce Federal
proscriptions, insofar as those proscriptions related to matter
appropriate for the judicial power, "124 but, relying on its holding
in New York, the Court in Printz, "conclude[d] categorically ...
[that] [t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program."125 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Printz states that the Framers of the
Constitution "rejected the concept of a central government that
would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a
system in which the state and federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people-who were, in Hamilton's
words, 'the only proper objects of government."'126 He concludes
that the structural separation between the States and the federal
118. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
119. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
120. Id. at n.3.
121. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
122. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993).
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371.
125. Id. at 2383, (citing, New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
126. Id. at 2377, (quoting, The Federalist No. 15, at 109 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
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government "reduce[s] the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front."
12 7
One commentator has suggested that the Court's opinion in
Lopez makes Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole the "most attrac-
tive alternative to date" for testing Congressional conditions on
federal spending. 12 That author concludes: 'With its decision in
Lopez, the Rehnquist Court made clear that the Commerce Clause
does not grant Congress 'a plenary police power. ' 1 29 She believes
Lopez suggests that "the Court should now reinterpret the Spend-
ing Clause to work in concert, rather than in conflict, with its
reading of the Commerce Clause."' 3 °
Another commentator suggests that Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in New York, together with her dissent in Dole,
suggest that the federal government's continuing efforts to force
States into policy decisions that serve federal objectives may be
beyond Congress' power under the Spending Clause. 131 This com-
mentator cites Justice O'Connor's opinion in FERC v. Missis-
sippi,132 in which she states: "The power to make decisions and set
policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature," and "[tihe
power to make decisions and set policy ... embraces more than
the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also includes the power to
decide which proposals are most worthy of consideration, the
order in which they should be taken up, and the precise form in
which they should be debated."'33 She concludes that opinion
stating: "The power to choose subjects for legislation is a funda-
mental attribute of legislative power, and interference with this
power unavoidably undermines state sovereignty."' 34 That com-
mentator concludes from Justice O'Connor's opinions that: The
Constitution's federal design protects against the abuse of govern-
mental power by diffusing that power between the federal and
state governments .. .Principles of federalism, as expounded in
New York .... call for a reevaluation of the Spending Clause anal-
127. Id. at 2378, (citing, Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).
128. Baker, supra. note 54, at 1956.
129. Id. at 1988.
130. Id.
131. Note, Federalism, Political Accountability and the Spending Clause, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1435-36 (1994) (hereinafter Harvard Note).
132. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
133. Id. at 779, (O'Connor, J. concurring and dissenting).
134. Id. at 785.
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ysis as well as for heightened sensitivity to the ways in which con-
ditional grants create impediments to political accountability. 135
It seems clear that a majority of the Court has articulated a
heightened interest in federalism since Dole was decided. How-
ever, the fate of future Congressional attempts to condition fed-
eral spending on States complying with federal regulation may lie
in the Dole majority opinion itself. In that opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stressed that the States had a real opportunity to
decline federal aid, and in doing so would only lose five percent of
the federal highway funds available. Similarly, in Steward
Machine, relied upon by the Chief Justice in Dole, the Court char-
acterized the federal unemployment insurance program as some-
thing the States could freely choose not to participate in. Whether
or not participation in those federal programs were realistic
options for the States, the Court's holding seems to hinge on the
notion that conditional federal spending is appropriate as long as
it does not truly coerce a State into compliance with federal regu-
lation. Such a rule is consistent with the holdings in New York
and Printz, and arguably consistent with Lopez. Indeed, in New
York Justice O'Connor found that the State could voluntarily
decline to open waste disposal sites for which it was offered a fed-
eral financial incentive, and upheld those financial incentives
against the State's Tenth Amendment challenge.136 Thus, as long
as a State is truly free to accept or reject the federal funds, accord-
ing to Dole and New York there is no improper invasion of
reserved State powers.
Commentators have called into question whether a State's
position vis-a-vis conditional federal spending can ever be truly
"voluntary" in light of the federal government's virtually unlim-
ited ability to tax income.1 37 But the fact remains that the Court's
current posture on conditional federal spending seems to be that
so long as the States can realistically "opt out" of the federal pro-
gram upon which appropriation of federal funds is conditioned,
the condition will not be found to violate the Tenth Amendment.
135. Harvard Note, supra note 131 at 1436.
136. New York, 505 U.S. at 173 .
137. T. McCoy & B. Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 86 (1988) ("As a commonsense political matter,
[the] financial dependence of the states on Congress's beneficence invites
Congress to extract concessions from the states . . . ") (hereinafter McCoy &
Friedman).
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How then is the proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act
likely to fare under a Spending Clause analysis before the Court?
The answer may lie in the RLPA's "general rule" which states that
Congress' "free exercise" condition is imposed on any "program[s]
or activit[ies]" which receive federal financial assistance, and the
expansive definition of "program or activity" given by Congress
and the courts. Unlike the federal highway funds at issue in Dole,
or the "financial incentives" in New York, the proposed RLPA may
not provide a State or local government with the realistic ability to
receive any federal funds without subjecting all of its programs
and activities to the federal condition. A comparison of the RLPA
with the federal Equal Access Act 138 provides a good example of
the distinction between the federal "encouragement" and "compul-
sion" contrasted in Dole.
VI. THE EQUAL AcCEss ACT
The federal Equal Access Act was enacted to end perceived
widespread discrimination against religious speech in public
schools. It states that "any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum,"
may not deny students "equal access" to school facilities to conduct
a meeting "on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical or
other content of the speech at such meetings.' 3 9 In Westside Com-
munity Sch. v. Mergens, 4 0 the Supreme Court upheld the Equal
Access Act against a First Amendment "Establishment Clause"
challenge, but did not address Congress' authority to attach the
"free exercise" condition to the federal funds at issue. However,
one United States District Court has held that, while the Equal
Access Act passed constitutional muster, a broader spending con-
dition "may not survive [constitutional] scrutiny."14 1 That Court
noted that Congress' spending power is limited "both by the Bill of
Rights and the Constitution's implicit protections of state sover-
eignty", but held that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Spending Clause in Dole led to the conclusion that the Equal
Access Act's spending condition is constitutional. That District
Court warned, however, that "in other cases, under other slightly
different circumstances, that result could change."142
138. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 - 4074.
139. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
140. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
141. Hoppock v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (D. Idaho 1991).
142. Id.
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Like the Equal Access Act, the RLPA's definition of "program
or activity" applicable to colleges, universities, other postsecon-
dary institutions and public school systems 14 3applies the "free
exercise" condition in the context of educational institutions.
Because that provision applies specifically to educational institu-
tions, it can be argued that its application is narrow, and does no
more than direct how federal education funds are to be spent.
However, that provision has a broader application than the Equal
Access Act, which applies to public secondary schools, and may be
one of those "other cases, under other slightly different circum-
stances", which one U.S. District Court has said will not survive a
Tenth Amendment challenge.1 4 4 Because it could be read to deny
any federal funds to all educational institutions in States that
receive federal funds, unless those institutions adopt Congress'
definition of "free exercise", the public education provisions of the
RLPA are unlikely to survive under a Dole analysis. However, if
those provisions are construed to only apply the federal condition
at a school which actually receives federal financial assistance, it
will be more in line with the reach of the Equal Access Act, and
can be said to do no more than direct how the federal money
should be spent.
However, unlike the Equal Access Act, the broader and more
general definition of "program or activity" in the RLPA purports to
condition the receipt of all federal funds used in any State or local
government programs or activities. This is a much more extensive
federal intrusion into State and local affairs than the five percent
of federal highway funds at issue in Dole. The RLPA does not
seem to give a State or local government any realistic opportunity
to "opt out" of the federal "free exercise" requirement if it wants to
receive any federal funds at all. In light of the pervasive nature of
federal regulation, and the way in which the federal government
levies taxes andd returns the money to the States with federal
strings attached, it is unlikely a State or local government could
realistically accept any federal money without subjecting itself to
the RLPA's "free exercise" condition. 145 This appears to be the
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(2).
144. Hoppock, 772 F. Supp. at 1163.
145. See, e.g., L. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts
in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARv. J.L. PUB. POL'Y. 119, 130-31
(1993); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 121 at 124-25; L. Kaden, Politics, Money
and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 858, 870 (1979);
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regulatory
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intent of the RLPA: to subject as many State and local programs
and activities as possible to its "free exercise" condition. Because
the RLPA goes well beyond specifying how the federal money
should be spent, and it appears to attach the federal condition to
virtually all federal spending, even the narrowest construction of
the RLPA is much broader than the federal condition the Supreme
Court considered in Dole. Thus, the RLPA's "General rule"
imposing its "free exercise" condition on federal spending is likely
to be found to be "so coercive as to pass the point at which pres-
sure turns to compulsion."
1 4 6
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed RLPA purports to tie its "free exercise" condi-
tion to the use of federal funds in States' or local governments'
"program[s] or activit[ies]" in much the same way that the federal
Hatch Act addressed in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Comm'n. 141 tied the receipt of federal highway funds to the condi-
tion that the State officials administering those funds not have
"any active part in political management or in political cam-
paigns. In that case the Supreme Court upheld that use of the
Hatch Act as an appropriate Congressional regulation to insure
the integrity of State officials who administer federal funds. How-
ever, the amount of federal funds at issue was only an amount
equal to two years compensation of the offending State official' 49
and the Court's holding was premised upon its finding that the
State could realistically choose to refuse the federal funds. 50 Also,
the condition at issue in Oklahoma was only imposed on federal
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 31 (ACIR, Washington, D.C.
1984) ("1984 ACIR Report"); See also, U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Preemption of State and Local Authority:
History, Inventory and Issues 4 (ACIR, Washington, D.C. 1992); U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Regulation of State and
Local Governments: The Mixed Record of the 1980s 1 (ACIR, Washington, D.C.
1993).
146. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210, (quoting, Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937)). See Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 1404, 140 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1998)
(stating that Congress may not constitutionally authorize the President to
"cancel" parts of a bill passed by the Senate and House of Representatives, even
though he could properly veto "parts" if they were sent to him as separate bills).
147. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
148. Id. at 129, n.1.
149. Id. at 133.
150. Id. at 143-44.
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highway funds, whereas the proposed RLPA would condition all
federal spending related to State and local government "programs
or activities."
Because one of the definitions of "program or activity" adopted
by the RLPA applies specifically to educational institutions, that
provision has a better chance of survival if it is narrowly con-
strued to be no broader than the reach of the Equal Access Act,
and actually allows a State or local government to reject the fed-
eral condition and still receive some federal funds. However,
because the more general definition of "program or activity" in the
RLPA mandates that all "programs or activities" of State or local
governments that receive any federal funds are subject to the fed-
eral "free exercise" condition, virtually every program operated or
administered by a State or local government would be subject to
that "free exercise" condition. The only entities that are appar-
ently exempt are the State and local governments themselves.' 51
This result smacks of the "commandeering" of State governments
condemned by the Court in New York, and has been called "back
door commandeering"'-" because Congress' uses its spending
power to coerce States into conduct it may not otherwise constitu-
tionally compel. The majority in Dole held that such Congres-
sional coercion is a violation of the Tenth Amendment.' 5 3
The drafters of the RLPA are apparently concerned that the
Court's opinions in New York and Printz may lead courts to find
that the RLPA "commandeers" State perogatives, and they
address that concern by adding a section entitled "State Policy Not
Commandeered" which states: "A government may eliminate the
substantial burden on religious exercise by changing the policy
that results in the burden, by retaining the policy and exempting
the religious exercise from the policy, or by any other means that
eliminates the burden."' 54 While addressing a legitimate and
compelling concern about the constitutionality of the RLPA, this
section does more to highlight the constitutional infirmity than
alleviate it. This section merely restates the obvious: if States
want to avoid losing federal financial assistance they can do what
Congress is attempting to compel; "change[ I the policy that
results in the [ "free exercise"] burden,.... retain[ ] the policy and
exempt[ ] the religious exercise from that policy, or [otherwise]
151. Supra notes 47-50.
152. 1984 ACIR Report, supra note 146 at 271.
153. Dole, supra, 483 U.S. at 210.
154. RLPA, supra note 10, 2(d).
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eliminate the burden." Congress' expression of concern about pos-
sibly commandeering State policy demonstrates its awareness of
serious Tenth Amendment problems with the RLPA.
Thus, unlike Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
has its constitutional foundation in Congress' power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the Equal
Access Act, which applies only to public secondary schools, the
proposed RLPA is attempting to apply its "free exercise" condition
to virtually all federal spending in a way which the Supreme
Court has already said is beyond Congress' Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power.' 5 5 The obvious effect of the Court's find-
ing RFRA to be beyond Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcment powers should be to allow each State to decide for
itself whether it wants to impose a "compelling State interest" test
on its laws which burden the "free exercise" of religion. However,
if Congress wants to use its spending power to impose the "free
exercise" condition on State and local activities, following
Oklahoma and like the Equal Access Act, it should condition the
award of federal funds in particular programs or activities, on a
statute-by-statute basis, in a way that allows States and local gov-
ernments the realistic option of rejecting the funds. Moreover,
Congress should keep in mind Justice O'Connor's admonition that
the Spending Clause does not allow Congress to "go beyond speci-
fying how the money should be spent."156 If, as is presently pro-
posed, essentially all federal funds will carry the "free exercise"
condition, then the States and local governments will have no
realistic ability to reject the condition because they cannot operate
without federal financial assistance. Such a pervasive condition
would be "so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns
into compulsion', 1 7 violating the Tenth Amendment. 58
155. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
156. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Choper, supra
note 11 at 2307-2308+.
157. Id. at 210.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
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